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24 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Executive and Planning Division


SUBJECT : Report to the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board

The following compilation by this Staff may prove of value
in preparing the Office of Security section of the annual report to
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ACCOMPLISHMENTS

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b. In an effort to improve monitoring of threats to intelligence sources and methods resulting from misconduct or circumstances affecting persons presently or previously privy to sensitive intelligence information through employment or operational relationships, a thorough security review is conducted of multi-source input materials, including compartmented information, relating to such situations world-wide. Material reviewed relates to arrests and detention abroad, smuggling, narcotics traffic, extremist political activity, travel to hostile foreign states, etc. As a result of this activity, a number of preventive measures have been instituted to protect Agency sources and methods in certain cases involving misconduct by or foreign police/intelligence interest in U.S. citizens formerly having classified access.

c. In mid-1970, the DCI declassified the highly effective, Agency-developed, Trace Metal Detection Technique and made it available to the U.S. Department of Justice for appropriate technology transfer to the nation's law enforcement agencies. In support of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Attorney General's executive agent for the program, the Office of Security provided trained personnel for temporary duty assignment with LEAA to provide briefings and seminars for some one hundred and fifty police organizations in the United States and,

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d. The Office of Security during this period also took the initiative in securing the declassification of another Agency-developed technique with broad potential for police use. The technique, the Explosive Residue Detection Technique, has been declassified by the Director and has been made available by him to the U.S. Department of Justice. Coordination has already been effected with the Technical Services Division to facilitate technology transfer to allied and friendly intelligence and security services. U.S. National Agencies were briefed on the technique,

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and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has been charged with relaying the technique to local law enforcement authorities in the U.S.

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
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
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STATISTICAL

During the Fiscal Year, this Staff opened 1,271 cases and closed 1,389 cases, leaving its present case load at 905 special investigations and 73 "routine" counterintelligence cases pending. The Staff was involved in 1,108 instances of operational support and serviced 533 inquiries from other components as well as 796 liaison inquiries from other government agencies. It was necessary during this period to review 15,977 intelligence and security files, as well as review and exploitation of 6,129 intelligence reports and 11,027 communications and reports from other government agencies. The same period saw this Staff conducting 326 interviews and 517 source contacts. Special records source checks totalled 475. One hundred eighty-four cases were referred to this Staff and 833 polygraph reports were reviewed. Members of this Staff attended 255 meetings outside the Staff and engaged in 19 man-working-days of TDY travel to major U.S. cities and abroad. Defector debriefings involved preparation and distribution of 2,655 manuscript pages.



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CHANGING OBJECTIVES AND APPROACHES

The continuing objective of this Staff is to negate, through counterintelligence action, the efforts of hostile and sometimes "friendly" nations to penetrate this Agency, its sources and its methods. A secondary objective relates to similar counterintelligence action relative to U.S. government personnel at home and abroad. Absolute management control is required of all continuing

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cases to allow for full flexibility and redirection of personnel efforts when a major penetration attempt is detected.

The objective, of course, does not change, but the approach to the mammoth counterintelligence problem facing this Agency and the U.S. government requires handling of immediate requirements in such a manner that crisis or immediate case situations can be handled with a minimum of disruption of these similarly important activities. Specific national and geographical assignments to the personnel of this Staff facilitate continuity and promote the degree of familiarity with hostile and "friendly" intelligence services' personnel and operations necessary to accomplish the required task.

PRIORITIES

Major priorities have been established based on the evaluated threat from major opposition services and historical analysis of past successes by each. Ranking of priority is flexible and readily changed upon indication of increasing or diminishing threat from

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
RESTRICTIONS AND CONSTRAINTS ON OPERATIONS

Presently the major restrictions and constraints upon this Staff's operations are budgetary and personnel. A limited personnel ceiling equally limits Staff exploitation of counterintelligence threats. By necessity, the Staff must concentrate on specific cases of interest without much benefit of professional correlation with other cases and areas of interest. The limited personnel staffing posture required of this Staff demands a continuing high degree of professionalism by its members, and adept utilization of all tools available to circumvent laborious and man-hour consuming detail whenever possible. Use of automatic data processing for this purpose has been severely limited due to budgetary restrictions.

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The significance of the problem becomes readily apparent when one attempts to estimate the unfavorable ratio between the total number of hostile and "friendly" intelligence personnel targeted against this Agency, its sources, methods and personnel, and the small size of this Staff which is attempting to detect, counter and thwart such attempts. The ratio is, indeed, an undesirable one.



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Chief, Security Research Staff

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